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This paper concerns two interpretations of Kant’s second Analogy in the Critique of Pure Reason. On 
the one hand, Paul Guyer argues that the goal of the second Analogy is to provide grounds for the 
confirmation of beliefs about causal relations. Henry Allison, on the other hand, argues that the 
principle of the second Analogy is a condition of the possibility of experiencing succession, whether 
subjective or objective. Their starkly different views on the aims and coherence of Kant’s overall 
system clearly influence their interpretive differences in the specific context of the second Analogy. 
The exegetical investigation required to evaluate each point of divergence between them is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Instead, as regards the second Analogy in particular, I focus on one point where 
Guyer’s position has been misrepresented. Allison characterizes Guyer as equating objective validity 
with empirical truth. I show that Guyer is equating objective validity with justification, or a claim to 
knowledge, rather than knowledge itself. Therefore, Allison has misinterpreted Guyer’s interpretation 







This paper concerns two interpretations of Kant’s second Analogy in the Critique of 
Pure Reason. On the one hand, Paul Guyer argues that the goal of the second 
Analogy is to provide grounds for the confirmation of beliefs about causal relations. 
Henry Allison, on the other hand, argues that the principle of the second Analogy is a 
condition of the possibility of experiencing succession, whether subjective or 
objective. After summarizing the Analogies generally and the second Analogy in 
more detail, I present Guyer’s interpretation, followed by Allison’s objections. While 
Allison’s interpretation may be preferable in general, this paper shows that, as regards 
the second Analogy, Allison’s primary objection to Guyer is based on an inaccurate 
reading of Guyer’s position. Among other objections, Allison characterizes Guyer as 
equating objective validity with empirical truth. I show that Guyer is equating 
objective validity with justification, or a claim to knowledge, rather than knowledge 
itself. This interpretation depends upon a particular understanding of Kant’s views on 
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the relationship between experience and belief. The view that Guyer attributes to Kant 
is counterintuitive, but a thorough examination of his interpretation requires more 
investigation into Kant’s psychology than is possible here. 
 
A note before we begin: there is already a vast literature on Kant’s “Analogies of 
Experience” due, at least partially, to their later importance in the “Refutation of 
Idealism” which was added to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. One 
interpretive issue that comes up in the secondary literature is whether these two 
sections of the Critique can be taken separately from Kant’s larger project of 
transcendental idealism or must stand or fall with the larger project. Paul Guyer is a 
proponent of the former view, while Henry Allison favors a holistic interpretation of 
the Critique.1 Their starkly different views on the aims and coherence of Kant’s 
overall system clearly influence their interpretive differences in the specific context 
of the second Analogy. Both scholars offer readings faithful to the text, and the 
exegetical investigation required to evaluate each point of divergence between them is 
far beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, as regards the second Analogy in 
particular, I focus on one point where Guyer’s position has been misrepresented.  
 
In the second edition formulation of the Analogies of Experience Kant claims 
“[e]xperience is possible only through the representation of a connection of 
perceptions” that every experience presupposes a connection to some other 
experience (Kant 1998, 295). The goal of the Analogies is to demonstrate both the 
possibility and the necessity of this representation. In the service of this end, Kant 
offers a proof of each of the categories of relation individually. The a priori 
presupposition of these categories, substance/accident, cause/effect, and 
community/reciprocity, grounds experience of the three modes of time, persistence, 
succession, and simultaneity (Kant 1998: 296). The First Analogy, which focuses on 
the category of substance, or persistence, offers a proof of the principle that all 
change of appearances is only alteration grounded in a single substance persisting in 
time (Kant 1998, 304). This substance is necessary to connect all of our 
representations. Without this substratum, objects would continually be coming into 
and going out of existence, without temporal or spatial continuity. The second 
Analogy, dealing with the category of succession, presents a proof of the principle 
that all alterations occur according to a priori rules, namely the law of cause and 
effect (B234, Kant 1998, 304-05). Since I will discuss the second Analogy for the 
remainder of this paper it does not require a detailed description here. The Third 
Analogy, of the category of simultaneity, seeks to prove that all substances that are 
simultaneous are in interaction with one another (Kant 1998, 316). Objects are 
                                                          
1Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987). Henry E Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2004). 
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perceived as simultaneous if the perception of one can follow the perception of the 
other in no necessary order, as in Kant’s famous example of looking at a house. This 
is opposed to the principle of succession, in which perceptions must occur in a 
particular order, as those of a boat traveling downstream. Kant posits that if A and B 
are simultaneous, they have each determined each other. If this were not the case, if A 
and B were simultaneous but did not interact, then the fact that the perception of B 
follows that of A would lead us to believe that the first caused the second, that they 
were successive. Things that are simultaneous mutually determine each other, or are 
in constant interaction (Kant 1998; 318). For example, the moon and the earth are two 
simultaneous objects that interact through the force of gravity. If objects that exist 
simultaneously were not mutually determining, then we would not be able to 
distinguish between perceiving them as simultaneous and perceiving them as in 
sequence. Simultaneity is a symmetric relation, while succession is an asymmetric 
one. It only goes in one direction. Therefore all objects that exist simultaneously are 
in mutual interaction with one another. The Analogies of Experience function to 
deduce our right to employ the relational categories in a way that gives us access to 
time determination that is objective, a judgement to which you would expect 
universal assent, rather than purely subjective, a matter of opinion.2  
 
To return to the second Analogy, it specifically seeks to prove that every event that 
we experience presupposes a preceding event. It is clear that this is intimately 
connected to the rationalist doctrine of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Thus, in the 
first edition, Kant writes that every event, “presupposes something which it follows in 
accordance with a rule.” In the second edition he instead writes that all events, “occur 
in accordance with the law of cause and effect”.3 The principle espoused asserts that 
to experience any event requires the assumption of a previous event containing the 
conditions of the possibility of the event that we experience. Thus, the first key 
component of this Analogy is the claim that we must assume every event is caused as 
a necessary precondition for experiencing events. Just as the First Analogy proves 
that experiences of events just are experiences of alteration, so the Second proves that 
to experience events we must assume that this alteration is caused. Without the 
assumption that every event has a cause we would not perceive distinct events, 
objects, or appearances at all. Instead we would be confronted with the 
undifferentiated manifold of experience, James’ “blooming, buzzing confusion.”4 The 
                                                          
2This is a position which can be found in both Guyer and Allison, as well as Arthur Melnick, 
Kant’s Analogies of Experience. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973) and Eric Watkins, 
Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
 
3 There is some interpretive controversy over whether the Second Analogy refers to sequences of 
events, or to sequences of representations constituting an event. However, Allison and Guyer 
both agree on the latter interpretation so I will not delve into the issue here. 
 
4 William James. “The Principles of Psychology” (1890), 462. 
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second Analogy specifies the conditions in which we can subsume our experience 
under the law of cause and effect. It provides the rule by which we determine that our 
constant perception of successive apprehensions is representative of an actual 
succession of appearances. Kant claims that when we perceive appearances as 
changing over time (a state exists at one time, the opposite of which exists at another 
time), we are really linking two distinct appearances (Kant 1998: 304). Although we 
represent these appearances as connected, we do not directly experience cause and 
effect. Rather than perceiving some state of affairs, A, as causing another state of 
affairs, B, we merely perceive A as preceding B. Subsuming this experience under the 
law of causality requires an inferential move which the mere succession of our 
representations does not sufficiently substantiate. The rule that justifies this inference 
is necessity: that if A causes B, we cannot experience B prior to A. That the 
fluctuation in representations constituting an event occurred in a particular, 
determined order is what makes the difference between a mere succession of 
apprehensions, which are subjective, and a succession of states of affairs, which are 
objective (Kant 1998: 308).  
 
Here Kant acknowledges what may appear to be a contradiction. In previous remarks 
on the understanding, Kant has argued that only through the perception and 
comparison of many appearances does the understanding come to discover rules, 
whereas here he claims that causality is an a priori principle of the understanding 
(A196/B241). Kant’s response is that this is only the case with particular empirical 
rules. The category of causality is pure a priori and, like other pure a priori 
representations, “we can extract [them] as clear concepts from experience only 
because we have put them into experience, and experience is hence first brought 
about through them” (308-09).  Which is to say that although beliefs about particular 
causal laws (i.e. that if you apply heat to a gas it will increase in volume, and vice 
versa), are formed through repeated experience, the broader concept that events have 
causes is a necessary precondition of the experience of events in the first place. It is 
not derived from experience and cannot be directly experienced, but necessarily 
grounds the kinds of experiences that we, as humans who receive appearances 
through the twelve categories, have. The question of how a particular state A gives 
rise to another state B is an empirical question of which we can have no knowledge a 
priori. This does not prevent us from having knowledge of the form of alteration, of 
the conditions under which it is possible that one state gives rise to another. The 
relationship between causality and justification is the focus of Guyer’s interpretation 
of the second Analogy, discussed more closely below. 
 
According to Guyer, the Analogies provide an “epistemological theory of the 
necessary conditions of time determination.”5 He argues that Kant’s theory of time 
determination must be understood, not as a psychological model of belief generation 
                                                          
5 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 207. 
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but rather as an epistemological model of the confirmation of beliefs.6 For Guyer 
then, Kant’s argument in the second Analogy is as follows: given that we must 
perceive states of affairs as following from preceding states of affairs, and that a 
succession of perceptions does not guarantee a successive state of affairs, some rule is 
required to justify our belief that a succession has occurred that is not merely 
subjective, but objective. In Kant’s famous examples, this rule justifies us in 
distinguishing between the succession of representations constituting the 
apprehension of a house, in which we can look at either the top or the bottom first, 
and those constituting the apprehension of a ship moving downstream, which we 
experience in a necessary or determinate order.7 On Guyer’s interpretation, particular 
causal laws are a requirement, not for successive representations generally, but for 
being justified in the belief that such a succession actually constitutes an event.8 As 
noted above, if Kant is understood as appealing to causal laws as evidence for the 
validity of causal laws, then he makes empirical laws necessary conditions of 
experience when, on his own view, they must be based on experience.9 Guyer’s 
reading of the second Analogy avoids characterizing Kant’s position as circular or 
question begging.  So long as Kant is making epistemic claims about the confirmation 
of beliefs, rather than psychological claims about the generation of beliefs he is not 
appealing to causal laws as evidence for the validity of causal laws. Instead Kant is 
appealing to causal laws for confirmation of beliefs about the causal relationships 
governing particular events. Guyer holds that the Analogies provide conditions for 
making knowledge claims, for confirming beliefs, not conditions for the possibility of 
experience, conditions for forming beliefs in the first place. Thus, the second Analogy 
is a proof of the conditions that must obtain for us to be justified in claiming that we 
have perceived an objective succession, as opposed to a subjective one. 
 
Allison criticizes Guyer’s position on several points. Setting aside his apparent dislike 
of Guyer’s insistence on a tight connection between the second Analogy and the 
Refutation of Idealism, he also regards Guyer as equating objective validity with 
empirical truth.10 There are two other main reasons that Allison considers Guyer’s 
reading to be inaccurate. First, Allison interprets Guyer as arguing that we require 
knowledge of particular causal laws to recognize instances of objective succession. 
Therefore, Allison claims that Guyer’s position is “implausible on the face of it, since 
                                                          
6 Ibid. 
 
7 Paul Guyer, “Kant’s Second Analogy: Objects, Events, and Causal Laws,” in Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason: Critical Essays ed. Patricia Kitcher (Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 1998), 126-7. 
 
8 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 252. 
 
9 Guyer, “Kant’s Second Analogy,” 138. 
 
10 Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 256. 
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we are obviously able to recognize instances of objective succession without being 
able to subsume that succession under a causal law”.11 Given that the empirical claim 
is dubious, we also have reason to doubt the stronger modal claim that knowledge of 
particular causal laws is a requirement for experiencing objective succession. 
Secondly, Guyer reads Kant as holding that we must be able to apply the schema of 
causality to justify our belief that an objective succession has occurred, while it is 
Allison’s view that the schema of causality is necessary to experience succession at 
all, whether subjective or objective.12  
 
In response to the claim that particular causal laws are necessary to recognize 
instances of objective succession, Guyer would say that while we need particular 
causal laws to justify the inferential move from successive apprehensions to a 
justified belief in objective succession, we do not need them to experience 
apprehensions as successive. Returning to Kant’s classic example, our representation 
of the ship as moving downstream does not require prior knowledge of the relevant 
causal laws in place. We do require those laws to be justified in the belief that the 
ship has in fact moved downstream, and could not have moved upstream.13 Guyer 
actually acknowledges that the principles of the analogies do not serve to ground 
special judgements about the behavior of objects that have already been proven to 
exist, they are the basis for determining that there are distinct objects at all.14 This 
same claim by Guyer also addresses Allison’s second objection. Guyer actually 
agrees that we must presuppose the concept of causality to experience distinct events 
and objects in the first place. However, he makes the separate claim that particular 
causal laws are necessary to justify or confirm the belief that an objective succession 
of appearances has occurred. 
 
Both of the preceding criticisms seem to be related to a larger objection that Allison 
holds against Guyer: that Guyer is equating objective validity with empirical truth.15 
Such a move on Guyer’s part would be a problem because both he and Allison 
acknowledge that the Analogies are concerned with the formal conditions of 
empirical truth, of which objective validity is one, not empirical truth itself. 
Objectively valid statements are claims about objects. If Guyer is conflating 
objectively valid and empirically true statements, then he is claiming that all 
                                                          
11 Ibid. 
 
12 Allison, 257. 
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statements about objects are, by default, empirically true. Kant defines empirical truth 
as the agreement of cognition with its object (A191/B236). However, appearances 
(a.k.a. objects) can only be distinguished from representations by subsuming the 
appearance under a rule that distinguishes it from other apprehensions. Such a 
judgment is based on exactly the presupposition that the second Analogy set out to 
prove. Therefore, only the formal conditions of empirical truth, conditions that must 
obtain for cognition to agree with its object, can be the subject of the second Analogy. 
To treat the second Analogy as about empirical truth would be to commit precisely 
the kind of question-begging that Guyer’s interpretation seeks to correct. 
 
Allison is incorrect in accusing Guyer of equating objective validity with empirical 
truth. What Guyer claims is that statements with objective validity are claims to 
knowledge. This is just what Guyer and Allison have already agreed upon: that 
objectively valid statements can be evaluated as true or false. Rather than equating 
objective validity with empirical truth, Guyer seems to be equating it with 
justification. In his chapter on the Transcendental Deduction, Guyer claims that the 
conception of experience  “already includes a claim to the objectivity of 
knowledge”.16 Insofar as we interpret Guyer’s terminology “conception of 
experience” to be interchangeable with perception and representation of 
apprehensions, Guyer is arguing that the process of representation is a claim to 
knowledge. We do not typically take our claims about objects to be meaningless or 
without purpose. We take them to be claims to truth, statements of reasons or 
justification for holding particular beliefs.17 Therefore, all Guyer is saying is that a 
representation is itself objectively valid, a potential source of justification, not that it 
has to be accurate. 
 
Allison raises important objections to Guyer’s position. In many cases, Allison’s 
interpretation of Kant may be preferable, either because it is more accurate to the text, 
or because it is a more charitable and coherent reconstruction of Kant’s argument. 
However, the main objection that Allison makes is misplaced. Guyer does not equate 
objective validity with empirical truth. While there are other facets of Guyer’s 
position that are problematic, the objection discussed here actually rests on a 
misunderstanding of Guyer’s claim that a principle of the condition of experience is a 
source of justification for beliefs about those experiences. Guyer does not appear to 
be committed to the idea that the principles explicated in the analogies are sufficient 
to constitute knowledge. Rather, it is these principles that we appeal to for 
justification of beliefs about time-determination. 
 
                                                          
16 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 95. 
 
17 This is of course assuming a verificationist, or at least quasi-verificationist theory of meaning. 
Verificationism is something addressed by both authors, but in the interests of brevity I am not 
discussing it here. 
